University of California, Hastings College of the Law

UC Hastings Scholarship Repository
Opinions

The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection

7-11-1968

Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Thomas Drayage etc.,
Co.
Roger J. Traynor

Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions
Recommended Citation
Roger J. Traynor, Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Thomas Drayage etc., Co. 69 Cal.2d 33 (1968).
Available at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions/609

This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Opinions by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact marcusc@uchastings.edu.

[So F. No. 22580.

In Bank.

July 11, 1968.]

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY, Plaintiff and
Respondent, V. G. W. THOMAS DRAYAGE & RIGGING
COMPANY, INC., Defendant and Appellant.
[1] Evidence-Extrinsic Evidence-Evidence in Aid of Interpretation-Evidence of Meaning of Instrument.-The test of admissibility of extrinsic evidence to explain the meaning of a
written instrument is not whether it appears to the court to
be plain and unambiguons on its face, but whether the offered
evidence is relevant to prove a meaning to which the language
of the instrument is reasonably susceptible.
[2] Oontracts-Interpretation and E:ffect-Intention ofParties.The intention of the parties as expressed in the contract is the
source of contractual rights and duties, and a court must ascertain and give effect to this intention by determining what the ;
parties meant by the words they nsed; the exclusion of relevant, extrinsic evidence to explain the meaning of a written
instrument is justified only if it is feasible· to determine the
meaning the parties gave to the words from the instrument
alone.
[S] Words and Phrases-''Word.''-A word is a symbol of thought
but has no arbitrary and fixed meaning like a symbol of algebra
or chemistry.
[1] See Oal.Jur.2d, Evidence, 1275 et seq; Am.Jur.2d, Evidence,
11069.
[2] See Oal.Jur.2d, Contracts, 1120; Am.Jur.2d, Contracts, § 244.
MeX. tUg. References: [1] Evidence, 1397; [2, 5] Contracts,
1127; [3] Words and Phrases; [4] Contracts, 1146; [6] Contracts,
1161(3); [7,10,11] Indemnity, 121; [8] Indemnity, §18; [9]
Evidence, 1247(0.5) •
•
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[4] Contracts-Interpretation and Effect-Surrounding Circumstances.-The meaning of a writing can only be found by interpretation in the light of all the circumstances that reveal the
sense in which the writer used the words; and the exclusion of
parol evidence regarding such circumstances merely because
the words do not appear ambiguous to the reader can easily
lead to the attribution to a written instrument of a meaning
that was never intended.
[5] Id.-Interpretation and Effect-Intention of panies.-AIthough extrinsic evidence is not admissible to add to, detract
from, or vary the terms of a written contract, these terms must
first be determined before it can be decided whether or not
extrinsic evidence is being offered for a prohibited purpose;
and rational interpretation requires at least a preliminary
consideration of all credible evidence offered to prove the intention of the parties, including testimony as to the circumstances -surrounding the making of the agreement, including
the object, nature and subject matter of the writing, so that
the court can place itself in the same situation in which the
parties found themselves at the time of contracting.
[6] Id.-Interpretation and Effect-Functions of Court-Ambiguities.-If the court decides, after considering all credible evidence offered to prove the intention of the parties, that the
language of a contract, in the light of all the circumstances,
is fairly susceptible of either one of the two interpretations
contended for, extrinsic evidence relevant to prove either of
such meanings is admissible.
[7] Indemnity-Actions-Evidence.-In an indemnitee's action
against his indemnitor for damages for injury to plaintiff's
property under the indemnity clause of a contract, the court
.e.ommitted reversible error in refusing to consider extrinsic
evidence offered by defendant to show that the indemnity
clause in the contract was not intended to cover plaintiff's
property, where, although that evidence was not necessary to
show that the indemnity clause was reasonably susceptible of
the meaning contended for by defendant, it was nevertheless
relevant and admissible on that issue, and where, since the
indemnity clause was reasonably susceptible of that meaning,
the offered evidence was also admissible to prove that the
clause had that meaning and did not cover injuries to plaintiff's property.
La] Id.-Actions-Defenses.-An indemnity clause phrased in general terms will not be interpreted to provide indemnity for
consequences resulting from the indemnitee's own actively
[7] See Cal.Jur.2d, Indemnity, § 14; Am.Jur., Indemnity (1st ed
§I5).
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negligent acts, and if an indemnitee's own active negligencc
is a cause of the harm, the indemnitor is relieved of liability.
(9] Evidence-Hearsay-Declarations in Papers and DocumentsInvoices, Bills and Receipts.-Invoices, bills, and reccipts for
repairs are hearsay and are inadmissible independently to
provc that liability for the repairs was incurred, that payment
was made, or that the charges were reasonable; but if a party
testifies that he incurred or discharged a liability for repairs,
auch documents may be admitted for the limited purpose of
corroborating his testimony, and if the charges were paid, the
testimony and documents are evidence that the charges were
reasonable.
[10] Indemnity-Actions-Evidence.-In an indemnitee's action
against his indemnitor for damages for injury to its property
under an indemnity clause of a contract, use of invoices for
repairs to the damaged property to prove that the specifie
repairs had been made was error, where no qualified witness
was called to testify that the invoices accurately recorded the
work done on the property, and there was no other evidence
as to what repairs were made.
[11] Id.-Actions-Bvidence.-An expert must base his opinion
either on facts personally observed or on hypotheses that find
support in the evidence; thus in an indemnitee's action against
his indemnitor for damages for injury to its property under
the indemnity clause of a contract, defendant's objections to
the testimony of plaintiff's expert as to the reasonableness of
charges for repairs to the property should have been sustained
where the testimony was based on hearsay evidence inadmissible to prove that the repairs had been made.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the
City and County of San Francisco. William A. 0 'Brien,
Judge. Reversed.
Action for damages for injury to property under an indemnity clause of a contract. Judgment for plaintiff reversed.
Miller, Van Dorn, Hughes & O'Connor, Richard H. McConnell and Daniel C. Miller for Defendant and Appellant.
Richard H. Peterson, Gilbert L. Harrick and Donald Mitchell for Plaintiff and Respondent.
TRAYNOR, C. J.-Defendant appeals from a judgment for
plaintiff in an action for damages for injury to property
under an indemnity clause of a contract.

36

PACIFIC GAS & E. CO. tI. G. W.
THOMAS DRAYAGE ETC. CO.

[69 C.2d

In 1960 defendant entered into a contract with plaintiff to
furnish the labor and equipment necessary to remove and
replace the upper metal cover of plaintiff's steam turbine.
Defendant agreed to perform the work" at [its] own risk and
~xpense" and to "indemnify" plaintiff "against all loss,
damage, expense and liability resulting from . . . injury to
property, arising out of or in any way connected with the
performance of this contract." Defendant also agreed to procure not less than $50,000 insurance to cover liability for
injury to property. Plaintiff was to be an additional named
insured, but the policy was to contain a cross-liability clause
extending the coverage to plaintiff's property.
During the work the cover fell and injured the exposed
rotor of the turbine. Plaintiff brought this action to recover
$25,144.51, the amount it subsequently spent on repairs. During the trial it dismissed a count based on negligence and
thereafter secured judgment on the theory that the indemnity
provision covered injury to all property regardless of ownership.
Defendant offered t{l pro¥e by admissions of plaintiff's
"genTS. b~- defendant's ("onduct under similar eontracts
entered iilto with plaintiff, and by other proof that in the
indemnity clause the parties meant to cover injury to property of third parties only and not to plaintiff's property.1
Although the trial c.ourt observed that the language used was
, 'the classic language for a third party indemnity provision"
and that" one could very easily conclude that . . . its whole
intendment is to indemnify third parties," it nevertheless
held that the "plain language" of the agreement also
required defendant to indemnify plaintiff for injuries to
plaintiff's property. Having determined that the eontract had
a plain meaning, thc court refused to admit any extrinsic
evidence that would contradict its interpretation.
When ,he court interprets a contract on this basis, it deterlAlthough this offer of proof might ordinarily be regarded as too
general to provide a ground for appeal (Evid. Code, § 354, 8ubd. (a);
Beneficial etc. Ins. Co. v. Kurt llitke 4' Co. (1956) 46 Cal.2d 517, 522
1297 P.2d 428]; Stickclv. Sun Diego Elec. By. Co. (1948) 32 Cal.2d 157,
162·164 [19" P.2d 416]; Douillard v. Woodd (1942) 20 Cal.2d 665, 670
1128 P.2d 6]), since the conrt repeatedly ruled that it would not admit
(lxtrillsic evidence to iuterpret the contract and sustained objections to
all questiolls seeking to elicit snch eviilcnce, no formal offer· ot proof
was required. (I<Jvid. Code, § 354, subd. (b); Beneficial etc. In8. Co. v.
Ktlrt Ilitke <t Co., supra, 46 Cal.2tl 517, 522; E~tatc of Kearns (1950)
36 Cal.2d 531, 537 [225 P.2d 218].)
•..J
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mines the meaning of the instrument in accordance with the
00. • • extrinsic evidence of the judge's own linguistic education and experience." (3 Corbin on Contracts (1960 ed.)
[1964 Supp. § 579, p. 225, fn. 56].) The exclusion of testimony that might contradict the linguistic background of the
judge reflects a judicial belief in the possibility of perfect
verbal expression. (9 Wigmore on Evidence (3d ed. 1940)
§ 2461, p. 187.) This belief is a remnant of a primitive faith
in the inherent potency2 and inherent meaning of words. 3
[1] The test of admissibility of extrinsic evidence to
explain the meaning of a written instrument is not whether it
appears to the court to be plain and unambiguous on its face,
but whether the offered evidence is relevant to prove a meaning to which the language of the instrument is reasonably
susceptible. (Oontinental Baking 00. v. 1(atz (1968) 68 Cal.
;2d 512, 520-521 [67 Cal.Rptr. 761, 439 P.2d 889]; Par~om v. Bristol Development 00. (1965) 62 Ca1.2d 861, 865 [44
pal.Rptr. 767, 402 P.2d 839] ; Hulse v. Juillard Fancy Foods
'Po. (1964) 61 Ca1.2d 571. 573 [39 Cal.Rptr. 529. 394 P.2d
651; Xti/ziger \". Hulman /1964. 61 Ca1.2d 526. 52B [39 Cal .
. Bptr. 3S!. 393 P.2d 690J ; C{J(1~t Balik \". JIind€rlwut ':1964.
61 Cal.2d 311, 315 [3S CalRptr. 505. 392 P.2d 2051; Jl1£oacn
v. Schultz (1962) 58 Cal.2d 858, 860 [27 Cal. Rptr. 160, 377
P.2d 272]; Reid v. Overla'nd Machi'ned Products (1961) 55
Cal.2d 203, 210 [10 Cal.Rptr. 819,359 P.2d 251].)
A rule that would limit the determination of the meaning
of a written instrument to its four-corners merely because it
seems to the court to be clear and unambiguous, would either
deny the relevance of the intention of the parties or presuppose a degree of verbal precision and stability our language
has not attained.
IIE.g., 00 The elaborate system of taboo and verbal prohibitions in
primitive groups; the ancient Egyptian myth of Khern, the apotheosis
of the words, and of Thoth, the Scribe of Truth, the Giver of Words and
Script, the Master of Incantations; the avoidance of the name of God
in Brahmanism, Judaism and Islam; totemistic and protective namcs in
mediaeval Turkish aud Fillno-Ugrian languages; the misplaced verbal
scruples of the • PrecieuseB '; tIle Swedish peasant custom of curing sick
cattle smitten by witchcraft, by making them swallow a page torn out
of the psalter and put in dough. . . .' from Ullman, The Principles of
Semantics (1963 ed.) 43. (See also Ogden and Richards, The Meaning
of Meaning (rev. ed. 1956) pp. 24-47.)
So 0 0 Rerum enim vocabula immutabilia sunt, homines mutabilia,'"
(Words are unchangeable, men changeable) from Dig. XXXIII, 10, 7,
I 2, de sup. Zeg. as quoted in 9 Wigmore on Evidence, op. cit. supra,
12461, p. 187•

...
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Some courts have exprcsscd the opinion that contractual
obligations are created by the mere use of certain words,
wl\rtlier or not there was any intention to incur such obligations.4 Under this view, contractual obligations flow, not from
the intention of the parties but from the fact that they used
certain magic words. Evidence of the parties' intention therefore be,comes irrelevant.
[2] In this state, however, the intention of the parties as
expressed in the contract is the source of contractual rights
and duties.1i A court must ascertain and give effect to this intention by determining what the parties meant by the words
they used. Accordingly, the exclusion of relevant, extrinsic, eviilence to explain the meaning of a written instrument could be
justified only if it were feasible to determine the meaning the
parties gave to the words from the instrument alone.
If words had absolute and constant referents, it might be
p()ssibleto discover contractual intention in the words themselvcs and in the manner in which they were arranged.
Words, however, do not have absolute and constant referents.
[3] "A word is: a symbol of thought but has no arbitrary
and fixed meaning like a symbol of algebra or chemistry,
•.. " (Pearson v. State Social Welfare Board (1960) 54 Cal.
2-d 184, 195 [5 Cal.Rptr. 553, 353 P.2d 33].) The meaning of
particular words or groups of words varies with the ". . .
verbal context and surrounding circumstances and purposes
in view of the linguistic education and experience of their
USPl'S and their hearers or readers (not excluding judges).
. . . A word has no meaning apart from these factors; much
less does it have an objective meaning, one true meaning."
(Corbin, The Interpretation of Words and the Parol Evidence
Rule (1965) 50 Cornell L.Q. 161, 187.) [4] Accordingly,
the meaning of a writing " . . . can only be found by inter4" A contraet has, strictly speaking, nothing to do with the personal,
or in,dividual, intent of the parties. A contract is an obligation attached
by the mere force of law to certain acts of the parties, usually words,
which ordinarily accompany and represent a known intent." (Hotchkiss
v. National City Bank of New York (S.D.N.Y. 1911) 200 F. 287, 293.
See also C. H. Pope tf Co. v. Bibb Mfg. Co. (2d Cir. 1923) 290 F. 586,
587; see 4 Williston on Contracts (3d ed. 1961) § 612, pp. 577·578, § 613,
p.583.)
5" A contract must be so interpreted as to give effect to the mutual
intcntion of the parties as it existed at thc time of contracting, so far as
the same is ascertainable and lawful." (Civ. Code, § 1636; see also Code
Civ. Proc., § 1859; Universal Sales Corp. v. California Press Mfg. Co.
(1942) 20 Cu1.2d 751, 760 P28 P.2d 665]; Lemm v. Stillwater Land tf
Cattle Co. (1933) 217 Cal. 474, 480 [19 P.2d 785].)
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pretation in the light of all the circumstances that reveal the
sense in which the writer used the words. The exclusion of
parol evidence regarding such circumstances merely because
the words do not appear ambiguous to the reader can easily
lead to the attribution to a written instrument of a meaning
that was never intended. [Citations omitted.]" (Universal
Sales Corp. v. California Press Mfg. Co., S1lpra, 20 Ca1.2d 751,
776 (concurring opinion) ; see also, e.g., Garden State Plaza
Oorp. v. S. S. Kresge 00. (1963) 78 N.J. Super. 485 [189 A.2d
448,454] ; Hurst v. W. J. Lake &7 Co. (1932) 141 Ore. 306, 310
[16 P.2d 627, 629, 89 A.L.R. 1222]; 3 Corbin on Contracts
(1960 ed.) § 579, pp. 412-431; Ogden and Richards, The
Meaning of Meaning, op.cit supra 15; Ullmann, The Princi. pIes of Semantics, supra, 61; McBaine, The Rule Against Disturbing Plain Meaning of Writings (1943) 31 Cal.L.Rev.
145.)
[6] Although extrinsic evidence is not admissible to add
to, detract from, or vary the terms of a written contract, these
terIns must first be detertitined before it can be decided
whether or not extrinsic evidence is being offered for a prohibited purpose. The fact that the terms of an instrument
appear clear to a judge does not preclude the possibility that
the parties chose the language of the instrument to express
different terms. That possibility is not limited to contracts
whose terms have acquired a particular meaning by trade
usage, 6 but exists whenever the parties' understanding of the
words used may have differed from the judge's understanding.
Accordingly, rational interpretation requires at least a preliminary consideration of all credible evidence offered to
6Extrinsic evidence of trade usage or custom has been admitted to
show that the term "United Kingdom" in a motion picture distribution
contract included Ireland (Ermolieff v. B.K.O. Badio Pictures, Inc.
(1942) 19 Cal.2d 543, 549·552 [122 P.2d 3]); that the word I I ton" in
a lease meant a long ton or 2,240 pounds and not the statutory tOll of
2,000 pounds (Higgins v. California Petroleum etc. Co. (1898) 120
Cal. 629, 630·632 [52 P. 1080]); that the word" stubble" in a lease
included not only stumps left in the ground but everything "left on the
ground after the harvest time" (Callahan v. Stanle'j, (1881) 57 Cal.
476, 477·479); that the term "north" in a contract dividing mining
claims indicated a boundary line running along the " magnetic and not
the true meridian" (Jenny Lind Co. v. Bower (1858) 11 Cal. 194, 197·
199) and that a form contract for purchase and sale was actually an
agency contract. (Body-Steffner Co. v. FloWl Products (1944) 63 Cal.
App.2d 555, 558·562 [147 P.2d 84]). See also Code Civ. Proc., § 1861;
Annot., 89 A.L.R. 1228; Note (1942) 30 Cal.L.Rev. 679.)

)
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prove the intention of the parties. 7 (Civ. Code, § 1647; Code
Civ. Proc., § 1860; see also 9 Wigmore on Evidence, op. cit.
supra, § 2470, fn. 11, p. 227.) Such evidence includes testimony as to the" circumstances surrounding the making of the
agreement . . . including the object, nature and subject matter of the writing . . . " so that the court can "place itself in
the same situation in which the parties found themselves at
the time of contracting." (Universal Sales Corp. v. California Press Mfg. Co., supra, 20 Ca1.2d 751, 761; Lemm v. Stillwater Land 47 Cattle Co., supra, 217 Cal. 474, 480-481.) [6] If
the court decides, after considering this evidence, that the
language of a contract, in the light of all the circumstances,
"is fairly susceptible of either one of the two interpretations
contended for . . . " (Balfour v. Fresno C. 47 I. Co. (1895)
109 Cal. 221, 225 [41 P. 876]; see also, Hulse v. Juillard
Fancy Foods 00., supra, 61 Ca1.2d 571, 573; Nofziger v. Holman, supra, 61 Ca1.2d 526, 528; Reid v. Overland Machined
Products, S1tpra, 55 Ca1.2d 203, 210; Barham v. Barham
(1949) 33 Cal.2d 416, 422-423 [202 P.2d 289] ; Kenney v. Los
Feliz Investment Co. (1932) 121 Cal.App. 378, 386-387 [9
P.2d 225]), extrinsic evidence relevant to prove either of such
meanings is admissible. 8
[7] In the present case the court erroneously refused to
consider extrinsic evidence offered to show that the indemnity
clause in the contract was not intended to cover injuries to
plaintiff's property. Although that evidence was not necessary to show that the indemnity clause was reasonably susceptible of the meaning contended for by defendant, it was
nevertheless relevant and admissible on that issue. Moreover,
since that clause was reasonably susceptible of that meaning,
7When objection is made to any particular item of evidence offered
to prove the intention of the parties, the trial court may not yet be in a
pQl'ition to detennine whether in the light of all of the offered evidence.
tlu! item objected to will turn out to be admissible as tending to prove a
meaning of which the language of the instrument is reasonably BUS·
eeptible or inadmissible as tending to prove a meaning of which the
language is not reasonably susceptible. In such ease the court may admit
the evidence conditionally by either reserving its ruling on the ohjection
or by admitting the evidence subject to a motion to strike. (See Evid.
Code, § 403.)
8Extrinsic evidence has often been admitted in such eases on the
stated ground that the contract was ambiguous (e.g., Universal Sale8
Corp. v. California Pre8S Mfg. Co., supra, 20 Ca1.2d 751, 761). This
statement of the rule is harmless if it is kept in mind that the ambiguity
may be exposed by extrinsic evi<lence that reveals more than one possible
menning.
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the offered evidence was also admissible to prove that the
clause had that meaning and did not cover injuries to plaintiff's property.9 Accordingly, the judgment must bc reversed.
[8] Two questions remain that may arise on retrial. On
the theory that the indemnity clause covered plaintiff's property, the trial court instructed the jury that plaintiff was
entitled to recover unless all of ". . . the following conditions
[were found] to exist:
"1. That Pacific Gas and Electric Company continued to
9The court's exclusion of extrinsic evidence in this case would be error
even under a rule that excluded such evidence when the instrument
appeared to the court to be clear and unambiguous on its face. The
controversy centers on the meaning of tbe word "indemnify ~, and the
pbrase "all loss, damage, expense and liability." The trial court's
recognition of the language as typical of a tbird party indemnity clause
and the double sense in which the word" indemnify" is used in statute8
and defined in dictionaries demonstrate the existence of an ambiguity.
(Compare Civ. Code, § 2772, "Indemnity is a contract by wbicb one
engages to save another from a legal consequence of the conduct of one
of the parties, or of some otber person," with Civ. Code, § 2527, "Insurance is a contract whereby one undertakes to indemnify another against
loss, damage, or liability, arising from an unknown ,or contingent
event." Black's Law Dictionary (4th ed. 1951) defines "indemnity"
as "A collateral contract or assurance, by which one person engages to
secure another against an anticipated loss or to prevent bim from being
damnified by the legal consequences of an act or forbearance on the part
of one of tbe parties or of some tbird person." Stroud's Judicial Die:
tionary (2d ed. 1903) defines it as a "Contract . . . to indemnify
against a liability. • . . " One of tbe defiuitions given to "indemnify"
by Webster's Tbird New International Dict. (1961 ed.) is "to exempt
from incurred liabilities.")
Plaintiff's assertion that the use of the word "all" to modify "loss,
damage, expense and liability" dictates an all inclusive interpretation
is not persuasive. If the word "indemnify" encompasses only tbirdparty claims, the word "all" simply refers to all such claims. The use
of the words "loss," "damage," and "expense" in addition to the
word "liability" is likeWise inconelnsive. Tbese words do not imply an
agreement to reimburse for injury to an indemnitee's property since
they are commonly inset"ted in tbird-party indemnity clauses, to enable
an indemnitee who settles a claim to recover from bis indemnitor without proving his liability. (Carpenter Paper Co. v. Kellogg (1952) 114
. Cal.App.2d 640, 651 [251 P.2d 40]. Civ. Code, § 2778, provides:
"1. Upon an indemnity against liability . . . the person indemnified is
entitled to recover upon becoming liable; :l. Upon an indemnity against
claims, or demands, or damages, or costs . . . the person indemnified is
not entitled to recover without payment thel"eof; . . . ")
The provision that defendant perfonn tbe work "at his own risk and
expense" and tbe provisions relating to insurance are equally inconclu·
sive. By agreeing to work at its own risk defendant may have released
plaintiff from liability for any injuries to defendant's property arising
out of the contract's performance, but this provision did not necessarily
make defendant an insurer against injuries to plaintiff's property. Dcfendant's agreement to proeure liability insuranee to cover damages to
plaintiff's property does not indicate whether the insurance was to cover
all injuries or only injuries caused hy defendant's negligence.
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maintain independent operation on the premises whereon the
installation of the cover was in progress j
"2. That the damage to the turbine was unrelated to the
Defendant G. W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Company,
Inc. 's performance j
"3. That the plaintifI was guilty of active, affirmative negligence j and
"4. That such active negligence related to a matter over
which the plaintifI exercised exclusive control. "
The instruction was based on certain guidelines discussed
in Goldman v. Ecco-Phoenix Elec. Oorp. (1964) 62 Ca1.2d
40, 45-46 [41 Cal.Rptr. 73, 396 P.2d 377] j Harvey Machine
00. v. Hatzel & Buehler, Inc. (1960) 54 Cal.2d 445, 448 [6
Cal.Rpt.r. 284, 353 P.2d 924] j and Safeway Stores, Inc. v.
Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. 00. (1962) 202 Cal.App.2d 99,
112-113 [20 Cal.Rptr. 820]. Those cases do not hold, however,
that all four conditions specified in the instruction must exist
for the indemnitor to be relieved of liability. It is sufficient if
the indemnitee's own active negligence is a cause of the harm. i
As stated in Markley v. Beagle (1967) 66 Ca1.2d 951, 952 [59!
Cal.Rptr. 809, 429 P.2d 129], "An indemnity clause phrased'
in general terms will not be interpreted . . . to provide
indemnity for consequences resulting from the indemnitee's
own actively negligent acts."
To prove the amount of damages sustained, plaintifI present.ed invoices received from Ingersoll-Rand, the manufacturer and repairer of the turbine, the drafts by which plaintiff had remitted payment, and testimony that payment had
been made. Defendant objected to the introduction of the
invoices on the ground thl1t they were hearsay. Subsequently,
plaintifI called a mechanical engineer who qualified as an
j expert witness on the repair of turbines. On the basis of photographs of the damage after the accident, he testified that to
repair the turbine it was reasonable and necessary to dismantle it completely, magnaflux all parts, replace all blades in
wheels that had been damaged, reassemble the rotor, balance
it, "indicate" it and centrifugate it. Similar repairs were
listed in the invoices, and over objection the witness was
allowed to testify that the amounts charged therefor were
reasonable.
[9] Since invoices, bills, and receipts for repairs are hearsay, they are inadmissible independently to prove that liability for the repairs was incurred, that payment was made, or

)

July 1968J

PACIFIC GAS & E. CO. tJ.
THOMAS DRAYAGE ETC.

G. W.
CO.

43

[69 C.2d 33; 69 Cal.Rptr. 561, 442 P.2d 641]

that the charges were reasonable. (Plonley v. Reser (1960)
178 Cal.App.2d Supp. 935, 937-939 [3 Cal.Rptr. 551, 80 A.L.R
2d 911] ; Menefee v. Raisch Improvement Co. (1926) 78 Cal.
App. 785, 789 [248 P. 1031].) If, however, a party testifies
that he incurred or discharged a liability for repairs, any of
these documents may be admitted for the limited purpose of
corroborating his testimony (Bushnell v. Bushnell (1925) 103
Conn. 583 [131 A. 432, 436, 44 A.L.R. 788]; Cain v. Mead
(1896) 66 Minn. 195 I68 N.W. 840, 841]), and if the charges
were paid, the testimony and documents are evidence that the
charges were reasonable. (Dewhirst v. Leopold (1924) 194
Cal. 424, 433 [229 P. 30J; Smith v. Hill (1965) 237 Cal.App.
2d 374, 388 [47 Cal.Rptr. 49] ; Meier v. Paul X. Smith Corp.
(1962) 205 Cal.App.2d 207, 222 [22 Cal. Rptr. 758] ; Malinson
v. Black (1948) 83 Cal.App.2d 375, 379 [188 P.2d 788];
Laubscher v. Blake (1935) 7 Cal.App.2d376, 383 [46 P.2d
836]. See also Gimbel v. Laramie (1960) 181 Cal.App.2d 77,
81 [5 Cal.Rptr. 88].) Since there was testimony in the present
case that the invoices had been paid, the trial court did not
err in admitting them.
[10] The individual items on the invoices, however, were
read, not to corroborate payment or the reasonableness of the
charges, but to prove that these specific repairs had actually
been made. No qualified witness was called to testify that the
invoices accurately recorded the work done by Ingersoll-Rand,
and there was no other evidence as to what repairs were made.
This use of the invoices was error. (California Steel Buildings, Inc. v. Transport Indemnity Co. (1966) 242 Cal.App.2d
749, 759 [51 Cal.Rptr. 797]. Accord, Bushnell v. Bushnell,
supra, 103 Conn. 583 [131 A. 432, 436]; Ferraro v. Public
Service Ry. Co. (1928) 6 N.J. Misc. 463 [141 A. 590] ; Noek v.
Lloyd (1911) 32 R.I. 313 [79 A. 832, 833].) An invoice submitted by a third party is not admissible evidence on this
issue unless it can be admitted under some recognized exception to the hearsay rule. 1o
[11] Since plaintiff's expert's testimony as to the reasonableness of the charges was based on hearsay evidence
inadmissible to prove that the repairs had been made, defendlOIt

might come in unuer the business recorus exception (Evid. Code,

§ 1271) if " . . . supported by the testimony of a witness qualifie<1 to

testify as to its identity and the moue of its preparation." (California
SteeZ BuiZdings, Inc. v. Transport Indemnity Co., supra, 242 Cal.App.2u
749, 759.)
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ant's objections to it should have been sustained. I I [A]n
expert must base his opinion either on facts personally
observed or on hypotheses that find support in the evidence."
(George v. llekins Van If Storage Co. (1949) 33 Cal.2d 834,
844 [205 P.2d 1037]. See also Kastner v. 1,os Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority (1965) 63 Cal.2d 52, 58 [45 Cal.
Rptr. 129. 403 P.2d 385]; Commerrial Union bsur. 00. v.
Pacific Gas If Electric Co. (1934) 220 Cal. 515, 524 [31 P.2d
793] ; Behr v. County of Santa Cruz (1959) 172 Cal.App.2d
697,709 L342 P.2d 9871; 2 Jones on Evidence (5th ed. 1958)
§ 416, pp. 782-783.)
The judgment is reversed.
Peters.•J., Mosk, J., Burke, J., Sullivan,
concurred.
McComb, j., dissented.

J

J., and Peek, J.,.

